Security Analysis (and Response) of Diebold Voting Machines.Ari Feldman, Alex Halderman, and Ed Felton released an amazing paper on the security of Dielbold's e-voting technology. The paper is accompanied by a ten-minute video that demonstrates some of the vulnerabilities they've uncovered. Here is the paper's abstract:
Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten
Princeton University
This paper presents a fully independent security study of a Diebold
AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its hardware and software. We
obtained the machine from a private party. Analysis of the machine, in
light of real election procedures, shows that it is vulnerable to
extremely serious attacks. For example, an attacker who gets physical
access to a machine or its removable memory card for as little as one
minute could install malicious code; malicious code on a machine could
steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, and counters to
be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker
could also create malicious code that spreads automatically and
silently from machine to machine during normal election activities -- a
voting-machine virus. We have constructed working demonstrations of
these attacks in our lab. Mitigating these threats will require changes
to the voting machine's hardware and software and the adoption of more
rigorous election procedures.
Along with the various weaknesses they discuss in the paper, Felton
later discovered that the lock "securing" the machine's components from
outside tampering could be opened with a standard hotel mini-bar key. Unbelievable.
Predictably, Dielbold responded (PDF) with their PR team in full spin mode, but Felton easily dispenses with their generally off-point retorts. Felton's conclusion:
Secure voting equipment and adequate testing would
assure accurate voting -- if we had them. To our knowledge, every
independent third party analysis of the AccuVote-TS has found serious
problems, including the Hopkins/Rice report, the SAIC report, the RABA report, the Compuware report, and now our report. Diebold ignores all of these results, and still tries to prevent third-party studies of its system.
If Diebold really believes its latest systems are secure, it should allow third parties like us to evaluate them.
[michaelzimmer.org]
6:18:27 PM PermaLink /
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